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Abstract
This paper examines the prospects of Africa’s changing age structure in favor of a 
temporary surge in the proportion of the working age population and the possibil-
ity of benefitting from the implied human endowment via appropriate develop-
ment strategies a la South-East Asia. 
An attempt to gauge the preparedness of sub-Saharan African countries in order 
to take advantage of the incipient demographic bonus, using South-East Asia as 
the platform of best practices, shows that sub-Saharan Africa must, on the aver-
age, grow the GDP to a higher level, reduce both public and private consumption 
expenditure in order to save and deepen more her investments in education at all 
levels and also enhance private spending on health. Besides, intra-African com-
parisons on the development efforts towards the attainment of the MDGs shows 
that a lot of sub-Saharan African countries are too slow to adapt to the changing 
age structure with appropriate social and human capital development policies 
and programs. 
Other important variables required, from the South-East Asian experience, are 
more investments in physical infrastructures, services and industrial production 
which are essential for employment generation in the economy. 
Introduction
As most of the African countries, like 
South Asia, are approaching the peak of 
their youth dependency and gradually 
transiting into the second stage of a 
temporary surge in the working age 
population, a situation that is almost 
terminating in the East Asian countries 
before the onset of ageing, the follow-
ing inquiries appear to be timely and 
pertinent:
a. What is the state of Africa’s demo-
graphic transition at this point in the 
millennium?
b. What are the a priori socio-economic 
implications of the changes in the 
youth dependency burden and the 
temporary bulge in the proportion of 
the prime working ages?
c. How prepared is Africa to take 
advantage of the demographic bonus 
in term of her human capital invest-
1. I wish to acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Stephen Awolaja, Department of Economics 
and Development Studies, Covenant University, OTA, NIGERIA in the search for data, 
and the benefit of the useful comments of an anonymous reviewer of the earlier draft of 
this manuscript.
http://aps.journals.ac.za
African Population Studies Vol  25, 2 (Dec 2011)
227
ments vis-à-vis those of South East 
Asian countries at comparable stages 
of demographic development?
d. What are the possible outcomes of 
inappropriate development policies 
for human capital development in 
the context of Africa’s demographic 
transition?
The state of Africa’s 
demographic transition
While the question raised by Livi Bacci 
(1999) about when a demographic tran-
sition begins is relevant to our discus-
sion of the state of Africa’s 
demographic transition, recently availa-
ble data and their diagnosis suggest that 
the region as a whole is experiencing 
the beginning of a fertility decline (Dud-
ley Kirk & Bernard Pillel, 1998; J. Cle-
land, I. Timaeus and N.Onuoha,1991).
The Demographic and Health Sur-
veys conducted between 1986 and 
1992 indicated that although fertility 
levels in the mid-1980s were still high 
and contraceptive prevalence low in 
most countries, successive surveys con-
ducted till 1995 showed the evidence of 
an initial fertility decline in two-thirds of 
the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. In 
most of these countries, the magnitude 
of the decline is modest. The fertility 
transition has not begun everywhere at 
TABLE 1 Trends in age distribution in Africa subregions and South East Asia (1970-2020)
Age Groups
0-14 YEARS 15-24 YEARS
YEAR SSA EAST SOUTH WEST NORTH SEA SSA EAST SOUTH WEST NORTH SEA
 1970 44.4 45.8 42.4 43.7 45.2 38.1 18.5 18.6 18.8 18.3 18.6 19.0
1980 45.2 46.3 42.1 44.9 43.5 34.2 18.6 19.1 19.6 18.5 19.7 19.0
1990 45.4 46.2 39.6 45.6 42.2 27.3 19.2 19.4 20.2 18.9 19.4 21.0
2000 43.9 45.2 34.6 44.0 36.4 24.6 20.0 20.1 20.6 20.1 21.1 15.3
2010 42.4 43.7 31.1 42.6 31.4 19.2 20.3 20.5 20.3 20.0 20.0 16.2
2020 39.7 41.1 29.3 39.9 29.0 18.0 20.2 20.3 18.9 20.1 17.1 12.3
25-59 YEARS 60 YEARS AND OVER
YEAR SSA EAST SOUTH WEST NORTH SEA SSA EAST SOUTH WEST NORTH SEA
1970 32.2 31.0 33.3 33.1 30.6 35.8 4.9 4.6 5.5 4.9 5.6 7.1
1980 31.2 30.0 33.2 31.8 31.2 38.9 4.8 4.6 5.1 4.8 5.6 7.9
1990 30.7 29.9 35.1 30.8 32.7 42.4 4.7 4.5 5.1 4.7 5.7 9.3
2000 31.3 30.1 38.9 31.2 36.1 48.9 4.8 4.6 5.9 4.7 6.4 11.2
2010 32.4 31.1 41.4 32.6 41.4 50.7 4.9 4.7 7.2 4.8 7.2 13.9
2020 34.8 33.6 42.5 34.9 44.9 51.4 5.3 5.0 9.3 5.1 9.0 18.3
Notes 
SSA-Sub-Saharan Africa; EAST-Eastern Africa; SOUTH-Southern Africa; WEST-Western Africa; 
NORTH-Northern Africa; SEA-South-East Asia; Source: United Nations Population Division, 
Population Estimates, The 2001 Revision.
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the same rate, and there are clear 
regional differentials. In particular, it 
would seem that in a group of countries 
in East and Southern Africa, the fertility 
transition is now well established and 
progressing at a rapid pace than in West 
Africa. 
It is conclusive that fertility has 
declined substantially during the 1980s 
in Kenya, Zimbabwe, Botswana, South 
Africa and North Sudan; it has declined 
somewhat in Tanzania, Swaziland, Sen-
egal and Southern Nigeria, but it has 
not declined in the other countries with 
recent data. Besides, fertility changes 
have been greater among urban and 
educated women living in areas of 
lower childhood mortality while coun-
tries more advanced in the transition 
are those where strong and efficient 
family planning programs have been 
implemented (Dudley Kirk et. 
al.,op.cit). May (1999) also opined that 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic could contrib-
ute to the decline in fertility because of 
the effect of the epidemic on increased 
foetal wastage and higher incidence of 
mis-carriage among HIV-positive 
women.
With the diagnosis of the onset of a 
fertility decline and its possible diffusion 
to the other countries, it is predictable 
that this phenomenon, if sustained, 
would lead to a change in the age struc-
ture of the population and eventually 
make it less youthful as the proportion 
of the population in their prime work-
ing ages increases.2
2.  The future course of the onset of decline in fertility could be modified. For example, it 
was observed that fertility stalled in mid-transition in some countries in Asia, Latin 
America, Southern Europe, and in Ghana and Kenya in Africa in the 1990s, and in some 
cases declined less rapidly than the levels projected earlier due to the levelling off in a 
number of fertility determinants including contraceptive use, the demand for 
contraception and the number of wanted births (John Bongaarts, 2006). It is also 
speculated that the incipient fertility decline being experienced could suffer from a 
“backlash” in terms of fertility increase that could be brought about by the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic and the related high levels of mortality (May, 1999 op.cit). Finally, the onset of 
a fertility decline observed from the 1980s does not tell us whether it will spread to the 
whole continent or whether it will be restricted to a few countries for sometimes yet. 
Besides, it is too early to know the pace of this decline (J. Cleland et al., op.cit.) 
 
0-14 years 
Figure 1 Trends in age distribution in Africa subregions and South East Asia (1970-2020) 
in graph 
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Table 1 and Fig 1 present the trajectory 
of age distribution in Africa from 1970 
till 2020 and that of South East Asian 
countries for the purpose of compari-
son. The United Nation’s medium vari-
ant projections utilized for the African 
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60 and above 
60 and above
http://aps.journals.ac.za
 African Population Studies Vol  25, 2 (Dec 2011)
230
sub-regions and South East Asia are 
based on the assumption of a continued 
downward trend in mortality coupled 
with the lowering of fertility levels but 
at differing rates.
For sub-Saharan Africa, as a whole, 
the proportion of dependent children 
under 15 years of age did not show any 
consistent decline until the 1990s when 
there was adequate statistical evidence 
that fertility rates had begun a down-
ward trend. This trend was accompa-
nied by slight increases in the pro-
portion of young entrants into the labor 
force (15-24 years old) and major 
increases, from 30.4 to 34.8 percent, in 
the proportion of the prime working 
age population (25-59 years old). This 
pattern of age distribution is shared by 
the East and Western African countries 
while the South and Northern patterns 
reflect more substantial changes, 
depicting more rapid changes in fertility 
declines. 
In contrast, the South East Asian 
region reflects a much earlier transition 
in family size behavior as the proportion 
of dependent children below 15 years 
of age started a downward decline 
twenty years or more earlier than sub-
Saharan Africa did. Besides, the propor-
tion of young entrants into the labor 
force increased from 1970 to 1990 and 
it is expected to decline substantially till 
2020 while the proportion of the prime 
working age population experienced an 
accelerated increase from 1970 and it is 
expected to maintain the momentum of 
growth till 2020 (from over 35 to 51 
percent.).
 
0-14 years 
Fig. 2 Trends in age distribution in selected African countries, representing the sub-regions 
(1970-2020) in graph
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While the trend in the age distribution 
of South East Asian region represents a 
complete shift from a very young popu-
lation to a working age and gradually 
expanding aged population as shown in 
Table 1/Fig 1, what we are witnessing in 
Africa as a whole, as depicted in Table 
2/Fig 2, is that countries like Nigeria, 
Ghana, Kenya, RSA, Botswana, Tunisia 
and Algeria are likely to have between 
one-third and a half of their population 
in the prime working ages of 25-59 
years before the end of this decade, 
accompanied by substantial reductions 
in child dependency especially in coun-
tries like Kenya, RSA, Botswana, Tunisia 
and Algeria. 
What are the socio-economic 
implications of the nascent age 
transition in Africa?
The unprecedented growth in the pop-
ulation of developing countries after the 
World War II was interpreted by policy 
makers and social science scholars in 
the West as a serious impediment to 
development that would rob the devel-
oping nations of the opportunity to 
improve their standard of living. Promi-
nent among these views were those 
expressed by Coale and Hoover 
(1958), National Academy of Sciences 
(1971). The latter emphasized the 
adverse effects of rapid population 
growth on capital formation, improve-
ment in social services, and the dangers 
of growing unemployment resulting 
from the accompanying rapid growth of 
the labor force.
In the 1980s, a widely held view 
that contrasted strongly with the earlier 
one, that rapid population growth is 
anti-development in the developing 
countries, emerged (Kelley 1988; 
National Research Council 1986; Julian 
Simon 1981). The view held was that 
population growth was not anti-devel-
opment but that it could either be neu-
tral or positive to economic growth. In 
recent times, the experience of the 
 
60 and above 
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South East Asian countries in the 1980s 
and 1990s with respect to the influence 
of demographic factors on economic 
growth has brought to the fore the 
potential economic consequences of 
the changes in age structure of the pop-
ulation as the society transits from a 
dominant youth population to a work-
ing age population; a process which is 
temporary along the demographic tran-
sition continuum and eventually termi-
nates with ageing of the population 
(Birdsall and Sinding, 2001).
One of the most important findings 
from this demographic process is that it 
creates, but for a limited period of time, 
a demographic “window of opportu-
nity”, at times referred to as “bonus” or 
“dividend” in terms of a larger ratio of 
potential workers to non-workers, 
meaning that more workers are 
responsible for fewer children. Theo-
retically, this phenomenon has many 
potential economic advantages. For 
example, the reduction in the ratio of 
youthful dependents to working-age 
adults should enable countries to 
increase their stock of physical and 
human capital in terms of schools and 
well-trained teachers, health care facili-
ties and well-trained health workers, 
and modern communication networks 
and well-trained workers to staff them 
(Merrick, 2002). 
This is predicated on the expecta-
tion that societies with a high propor-
tion of prime-age workers will enjoy 
higher per capita incomes, save more 
than those with higher proportions of 
young or old people, and increase 
investments to further boost economic 
growth. This is because the young and 
the old tend to consume more output 
than they generate, unlike working-age 
individuals whose contribution to out-
put and to savings tends to be more 
than commensurate with their con-
sumption. In addition, a fall in youth 
dependency ratio permits greater 
investment in schooling per child and a 
substantial increase in female labor 
force participation, rising levels of wo-
men’s education and increased demand 
for labor by a growing formal sector. 
How prepared is sub-Saharan Africa 
for the demographic bonus?
1. Comparing sub-Saharan Africa and 
South East Asia
On the basis of Table 1 depicting the 
trends in age distribution of the popula-
tion in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and 
South East Asia (EA), the latter is much 
ahead of the former in terms of the 
onset of fertility decline, as a precursor 
to the evolution of the prime working 
age population by at least 2 decades. In 
other words, most of the SSA countries 
seem to have arrived at SEA state of 
demographic transition of the 1960s in 
the 1980s. For the purpose of illustra-
tion therefore, it appears ex-pedient to 
juxtapose the socio-economic indica-
tors of development of the SEA coun-
tries from the 1960s with those of the 
SSA from the 1980s in order to gauge 
the distance between the two regions 
in terms of the socio-economic varia-
bles associated with the former’s 
demographic bonus. 
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Table 3 compares the trends in available 
socio-economic variables of develop-
ment from 1980-2009 and 1960-2009 
for SSA and SEA regions respectively. 
The growth in the gross domestic 
product in sub-Saharan Africa declined 
substantially in the 1980s and began to 
rise from around 1995 till 2005. On the 
other hand, while South East Asia expe-
rienced a gradual decline in its GDP 
growth from the 1960 till 2005, the rate 
at which the GDP was growing is con-
siderably higher than that of SSA coun-
tries.
In SSA, the percentage of the GDP 
allocated to household consumption 
increased gradually from the 1980s till 
present but virtually remains at two-
thirds of the annual GDP while the gov-
ernment consumption expenditure var-
ied between 15 to 17 percentage of 
GDP from the 1980s. In SEA, house-
hold consumption as a percentage of 
GDP from the 1970s averaged about 55 
percent, a magnitude slightly lower than 
that of SSA. Similarly, government con-
sumption expenditure varied between 
10 to 17 percentage of GDP but was 
generally lower than that of SSA.
In reverse, the percentage of the 
GDP saved domestically in SSA declined 
consistently from 25 percent in 1980 to 
16 percent recently. In SEA, on the 
other hand, the percentage of the GDP 
saved domestically declined slightly 
from 34 percent in 1970 to 27 percent 
presently, but was at a much higher 
level than that of SSA.
Tables 4-6 depict the various forms of 
major human capital investments into 
which savings can be channeled. As 
shown in Table 4, the percentage of the 
gross national product (GNP) devoted 
to education varied between 4.5 to 5.1 
from 1980 to 1997 in sub-Saharan 
Africa. This is much higher than that of 
South East Asian countries, and also 
that of South Asia, whose level of devel-
opment is not too dissimilar to that of 
sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast, the 
gross enrolment ratios at primary, sec-
ondary and tertiary levels are much 
lower in sub-Saharan Africa in compari-
son with South-East Asia and South 
Asian countries (see Table 5).
Table 4 Estimated public expenditure on education in sub-Saharan Africa, South East 
Asia and South Asia, % of GDP, (1980-1997)
Year Sub-Saharan Africa South-east Asia 
(Eastern Asia And 
Oceania)
South Asia
1980 5.0 2.8 4.1
1985 4.5 3.1 3.4
1990 4.6 3.0 3.7
1995 5.1 2.9 3.2
1997 5.1 2.9 3.3
Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics, World Education Report, 2000
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This contrast can possibly be explained 
in terms of either the higher child 
dependency ratio in sub-Saharan Africa 
or the human capital “deepening”3 in 
South-East Asia and South Asia or a 
much better efficiency in the manage-
ment of education resources in the 
Asian countries in general.
An examination and a comparison of 
budgetary allocation to health between 
African and South-East Asia regions 
show that Africa spends more of its 
resources on health in comparison with 
South-East Asia (see, table 6). This is 
likely to be due to more government 
outlay on health in Africa as South-East 
Asia records a much higher private 
spending on health.
From the South East Asian example, 
the changes in the age structure favor-
ing the prime working age population 
have been found to account for as 
much as a third to one half of the sus-
tained high rates of income growth that 
came to be known as the “East Asian 
Miracle” (Bloom, Canning and Malaney, 
2000). Of course, age structural change 
is not the only important variable in 
economic development. It will not nec-
essarily be converted to economic 
improvement unless other important 
non-demographic factors are in place 
(Cincotta & Engelman, 1997).
According to the World Bank 
detailed inquiry into the economic suc-
cess of the Asian Tigers in the 1980s 
and 1990s (World Bank, 1993), the 
non-demographic factors of the 
explained growth include, high rates of 
investment exceeding 20 percent. of 
GDP on average between 1960 and 
1990, including in particular unusually 
high rates of private investment, com-
bined with high and rising endowments 
Table 5 Gross enrolment ratios in sub-Saharan Africa, South-east Asia and South Asia, 1990 
and 1997
Year Sub-Saharan Africa Southeast Asia South Asia
Primary Secon-
dary 
Ter-
tiary
Pri-
mary
Secon-
dary
Ter-
tiary
Pri-
mary
Secon-
dary
Tertiary
1990 74.8 22.4 3.0 118.5 47.4 5.9 90.3 38.9 5.7
1997 76.8 26.2 3.9 118.0 66.3 10.8 95.4 45.3 7.2
Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics, World Education Report, 2000.
3.  One of the findings from the Asian demographic transition, investments and savings 
supply, is that higher youth dependency depresses savings more than investment while 
households tend to substitute quality for quantity as their incomes rise with respect to 
the number of children and expenditures per child (Matthew Higgins & Jeffrey G. 
Williamson, 1997) 
Table 6 Health expenditure ratios for Africa and Southeastern Asia region, 2000 and 2008
YEAR AFRICA REGION SOUTHEASTERN ASIA REGION
Total 
expenditure on 
health (% of 
GDP)
Private 
expenditure on 
health (% of total 
exp. on health)
Total 
expenditure on 
health (% of 
GDP)
Private 
expenditure on 
health (% of total 
exp. on health)
2000 5.5 56.3 3.9 67.9
2008 6.0 50.2 3.8 58.7
Source: WHO, World Health Statistics, 2009
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of human capital due to universal pri-
mary and secondary education.
In this paper, available evidence 
shows that the GDP and its rate of 
growth were much higher in SEA than 
in SSA at a comparable stage of their 
demographic transition. Besides, the 
percentage of GDP devoted to house-
hold and government consumption is 
higher in SSA than SEA. Expectedly, the 
percentage of GDP saved is a lot more 
in SEA than in SSA. While the percent-
age of GDP spent on education is 
higher in SSA, the gross enrolment ratio 
at all levels of education is higher in 
SEA. In Africa as a whole, there is pro-
portionally more government outlay on 
health than in SEA while the latter 
records a much higher private spending 
on health.
2. Comparing countries in Africa
If most of a nation’s population falls 
within the working ages, the added 
productivity of this group can produce a 
“demographic dividend”4 of economic 
growth, assuming that policies to take 
advantage of this opportunity are in 
place. According to Boom, et al (2001), 
a combination of a large working age 
population with development policies 
encompassing public health, family plan-
ning, education and the economy can 
create virtuous cycles of wealth crea-
tion. Given the ongoing demographic 
transition of African countries and the 
incipient changes in the population age 
structure, it is expedient to gauge the 
likely impact of the relative position of 
each country on the ladder of social and 
economic progress on the evolving 
demographic dividend. 
This is captured with reference to 
the relative performance of African 
countries on the attainment of the Mil-
lennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
and targets set from 1990-2015 to free 
humanity from extreme poverty, illiter-
acy and diseases (The Millennium 
Development Goals Report, 2011)5.
In spite of the current financial cri-
sis, Africa has had a high record of eco-
nomic growth since the beginning of 
the century. It has recorded a faster 
growth than most other world regions, 
with more than 40 percent of its coun-
tries enjoying an average annual GDP 
4.  Bloom et al. (2001) identified labor supply, human capital and savings as the most 
important mechanisms of the impact of the “demographic dividend”. It is expected that 
labor supply would gain from a higher proportion of working age population and an 
increase in the level of women participation in the labor force as they are gradually 
weaned from large childbearing due to family size decline. With respect to human capital, 
as life expectancy increases, parents are more likely to choose to educate their children 
and invest more on their health because of the high expected private and social returns 
to education in developing countries generally. For example, the result of educational 
investments on fewer children is that the labor force as a whole becomes more 
productive, thus promoting higher wages and a better standard of living. Also, the 
demographic dividend encourages the growth of savings (unlike the growth of the young 
and the aged, who are mostly consumers), thus improving the country’s prospects for 
investment and growth.
5.  According to Africa Progress Report 2011, tracking progress on the MDG achievement 
is an immense challenge due to a lack of sufficient reliable and updated data. There are 
also inconsistencies between national and global tracking efforts that make it difficult to 
compare progress across countries and regions (Africa Progress Panel, The 
Transformation Power of Partnerships, Africa Progress Report, 2011).
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growth rate of 5 percent or more dur-
ing the last decade. Based on IMF fore-
casts, sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP is 
expected to grow by 5.5 percent in 
2011 and 5.8 percent in 2012 with sub-
stantial differences between countries. 
Countries such as, the Republic of 
Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania and 
Zambia are all expected to be among 
the World’s ten fastest growing econo-
mies. The Central African Republic, 
Chad, Cote D’ivoire, Equatorial Guinea 
and Eritrea are projected to grow at 
rates far below the average (Africa 
Progress Report op. cit). 
Despite the progress made, the 
current economic growth is not all pos-
itive as it is not accompanied by struc-
tural transformation and diversification. 
In most countries, it relies on export-
led policies depending on extraction of 
natural resources and raw materials 
rather than value addition and diversifi-
cation. With the notable exception of 
Egypt, Tunisia and South Africa where 
manufacturing and services dominate 
the GDP, non-extractive sectors and 
competitive industries remain heavily 
under-developed in most African coun-
tries (Africa Progress Report op. cit).
The social and economic advance-
ment that is expected to accompany 
the modest economic growth attained 
is indicated in the score-card of each 
African country on the 7 main millen-
nium goals in Tables 7a-g. 
FIG 7a    
Distribution of African Countries by MDG Score-Card on the Main Development Goals. 
Goal 1: Eradicate Extreme Poverty& Hunger (53*) 
Achieved  On Track Off Track/Slow Regressing 
Algeria Benin Angola Chad 
Cameroon Congo Republic Botswana Cote D'ivoire 
Cape Verde Guinea  Burkina Faso Djibouti 
Egypt Mauritius Burundi Eritrea 
Ethiopia Swaziland Central Africa Republic Guinea Bissau 
Gabon Uganda Comoros Liberia 
Gambia   DRC Namibia 
Ghana   Equatorial Guinea Niger 
Kenya   Madagascar Nigeria 
Lesotho   Malawi Rwanda 
Libya   Mozambique Sao Tome and Principe 
Mali   Sierra Leone Tanzania 
Mauritania   South Africa Togo 
Morocco     Zambia 
Senegal     Zimbabwe 
Tunisia       
Source: Africa Progress Report, 2011 
* Includes one or two countries without data 
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FIG 7b 
 
Distribution of African Countries by MDG Score-Card on the Main Development Goals. 
Goal 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education (53*) 
Achieved  On Track Off Track/Slow Regressing 
Algeria Guinea Angola Botswana 
Benin Kenya Burkina Faso Cape Verde 
Burundi Mauritania Central Africa Republic DRC 
Comoros Mozambique Chad Equatorial Guinea 
Congo Republic Namibia Cote D'ivoire Lesotho 
Ethiopia   Djibouti Mauritius 
Liberia   Egypt Sudan 
Libya   Eritrea Swaziland 
Madagascar   Gabon   
Malawi   Gambia   
Mali   Ghana   
Morocco   Guinea Bissau   
Rwanda   Niger   
SaoTome and Principe   Nigeria   
Seychelles   Senegal   
South Africa   Togo   
Tanzania       
Tunisia       
Uganda       
Zambia       
Zimbabwe       
Source: Africa Progress Report, 2011 
* Includes one or two countries without data 
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FIG  7c 
 
Distribution of African Countries by MDG Score-Card on the Main Development Goals. 
 
Goal 3: Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women (53*) 
Achieved  On Track Off Track/Slow Regressing 
Botswana Algeria Cape Verde Angola 
Comoros Benin Central Africa Republic Cameroon 
Equatorial Guinea Burkina faso Chad Eritrea 
Gabon Burundi Congo Republic Swaziland 
Gambia Djibouti DRC   
Ghana Egypt Cote D'ivoire   
Guinea Ethiopia Guinea Bissau   
Kenya Liberia Mozambique   
Lesotho Mali Niger   
Libya Togo Nigeria   
Madagascar   Somalia   
Malawi   Sudan   
Mauritania       
Mauritius       
Morocco       
Namibia       
Rwanda       
Sao Tome and Principe       
Senegal       
Seychelles       
Sierra Leone       
South Africa       
Tanzania       
Tunisia       
Uganda       
Zambia       
Zimbabwe       
Source: Africa Progress Report, 2011 
* Includes one or two countries without data 
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FIG  7d 
 
Distribution of African Countries by MDG Score-Card on the Main Development Goals. 
Goal 4: Reduce Child Mortality (53*) 
Achieved  On Track Off Track/Slow Regressing 
Algeria Botswana Angola Central African Republic 
Cape Verde Djibouti Benin DRC 
Comoros Ethiopia Burkina Faso Nigeria 
Egypt Guinea Burundi   
Eritrea Libya Cameroon   
Gabon Madagascar Chad   
Gambia Mozambique Congo Republic   
Liberia Rwanda Cote D'ivoire   
Malawi Togo Equatorial Guinea   
Morocco Uganda Ghana   
Namibia   Guinea Bissau   
Sierra Leone   Kenya   
Tunisia   Lesotho   
    Mali   
    Mauritania   
    Mauritius   
    Niger   
    Sao Tome and Principe   
    Senegal   
    Somalia   
    South Africa   
    Sudan    
    Swaziland   
    Tanzania   
    Zambia   
    Zimbabwe   
Source: Africa Progress Report, 2011 
* Includes one or two countries without data 
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FIG  7e 
 
Distribution of African Countries by MDG Score Cards on the Main Development Goals. 
Goal 5: Improve Maternal Health (53*) 
Achieved  On Track  Off Track/Slow Regressing 
Benin Tunisia Burkina faso Algeria 
Eritrea   Cape Verde  Angola 
Ethiopia   Comoros Botswana 
Libya   Congo Republic Burundi 
Mauritius   Egypt Cameroon 
Mozambique   Equatorial Guinea Central African Republic 
    Gambia Chad 
    Ghana DRC 
    Kenya Cote D'ivoire  
    Morocco Djibouti 
    Niger Gabon 
    Nigeria Guinea  
    Rwanda Guinea Bissau 
    Somalia Lesotho 
    Sudan Liberia 
    Swaziland Madagascar 
    Togo Malawi 
    Uganda Mali 
      Mauritania 
      Namibia 
      Sao Tome and Principe 
      Senegal 
      Sierra Leone 
      South Africa 
      Tanzania 
      Zambia 
      Zimbabwe 
Source: Africa Progress Report, 2011 
* Includes one or two countries without data 
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FIG  7f 
Distribution of African Countries by MDG Score-Cards on the Main Development Goals. 
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other Diseases (53*) 
 
Achieved  On Track  Off Track/Slow Regressing 
Burkina Faso Benin Angola Algeria 
Burundi Congo Republic Botswana Cameroon 
Cote D'ivoire Kenya Cape Verde Chad 
Djibouti Liberia Central African Republic Egypt 
Eritrea Niger Comoros Equatorial Guinea 
Ethiopia Senegal DRC Gabon 
Gambia Sierra Leone Ghana Lesotho 
Morocco Uganda Guinea Libya 
Rwanda   Guinea Bissau Mauritania 
Togo   Madagascar Mauritius 
    Malawi Mozambique 
    Mali Namibia 
    Nigeria Somalia 
    Tanzania South Africa 
    Zambia Sudan 
    Zimbabwe Swaziland 
      Tunisia 
Source: Africa Progress Report, 2011 
* Includes one or two countries without data 
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These goals reflect the different dimen-
sions of human capital development 
that are complementary to the growth 
of the working age population such as 
advancements in poverty reduction, 
education, health, and women empow-
erment. 
Generally, the performance ratio of 
the goals, which are based on the ratio 
of countries that are achievers and 
those who are on track, to the total 
number of African countries with 
respect to each of the 7 main develop-
ment goals, are in the following order 
of magnitude; Promotion of gender 
equality and empowerment of women 
  
FIG  7g  
Distribution of African Countries by MDG Score-Card on the Main Development Goals. 
Goal 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability (53) 
Achieved  On Track Off Track/Slow Regressing Botswana Burkina faso Angola Algeria  Cape Verde Ghana Benin Comoros Djibouti Lesotho Burundi Nigeria Egypt Malawi Cameroon Somalia Gabon Sao Tome and Principe Central African Republic    Libya South Africa Chad   Mauritius   Congo Republic   Namibia   DRC   Tunisia   Cote D'ivoire        Equatorial Guinea       Eritrea       Ethiopia       Gambia        Guinea       Guinea Bissau       Kenya       Liberia       Madagascar       Mauritania       Mali       Morocco       Mozambique       Niger       Rwanda       Senegal       Seychelles       Sierra Leone       Sudan       Swaziland       Tanzania       Togo       Uganda       Zambia       Zimbabwe   
Source: African Progress Report, 2011  
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(69.8%), Achievement of universal pri-
mary education (52%), Reduction of 
child mortality (44.2%), Eradication of 
extreme poverty and hunger (44%), 
Combating HIV/AIDS, Malaria and 
other diseases (35.3%), Environmental 
sustainability (28.3%) and Improve-
ment of maternal mortality (13.5%). 
While 7 out of 10 African countries 
are promoting gender equality and 
empowerment, only about a half have 
achieved universal primary education. 
Less than a half has been able to reduce 
extreme poverty i.e. the proportion of 
people whose income is less than $1.00 
a day, reduce child mortality and com-
bat virulent diseases. Less than a third 
has been able to improve environmen-
tal sustainability in terms of adequate 
supply of potable water and access to 
improved sanitation.
Most countries record a mixed 
progress in the achievement of all the 7 
goals. Nevertheless, countries that are 
at the vanguard of social and human 
capital development in Africa constitute 
about a third of the total.6 Most of 
them are from North Africa viz; Tunisia, 
Libya, Morocco, Egypt, and Algeria. 
The others, located in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) are, Ethiopia, Uganda, 
Benin, Rwanda, Namibia, Mauritius, 
Malawi, Djibouti, Gambia, Kenya, 
Guinea, and Liberia. 
The promising countries, that still 
have a long way to go before 2015 set 
for the achievement of the MDGs, con-
stitute another third of the total. They 
are, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Sao 
Tome, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South 
Africa, Togo, Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cape Verde, Comoros, 
Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Gabon, 
Ghana, Lesotho and Madagascar. The 
remaining, about a third of the total, are 
the non-performing countries for which 
the 2015 time-line remains a mirage.
The implications and import of this 
analysis is that, among African coun-
tries, only about 2/3 of them are putting 
in place appropriate programs of social 
and human capital development that 
are complimentary to the changing age 
structure. 
Therefore, if we were to gauge the 
preparedness of SSA, using SEA as the 
platform of “best practices”, in order to 
take advantage of the incipient demo-
graphic bonus in Africa for a higher level 
of human capital as well as social and 
economic development, SSA is 
expected to grow the GDP to a higher 
level, reduce both public and private 
consumption expenditure in order to 
generate that level of savings needed to 
deepen her investments in education at 
all levels, at least to increase her enrol-
ment ratios; and to enhance private 
spending on health.
Other important variables that 
should be put in place a la SEA are 
investments in physical infrastructures, 
services and industrial production 
which are essential for employment 
generation in the economy. For exam-
ple, a rising and well endowed human 
capital would require jobs of higher 
skills and productivity in order to grow 
6.  Countries considered to be in the vanguard of social and human capital development in 
the continent are those who have achieved or are on the track of achieving 4 or more 
of the 7 main development goals. Those countries that are promising are the ones who 
have achieved or are on the track of achieving 3 of the development goals. The rest are 
non-performing countries who have achieved or are on the track of achieving 2 or less 
of the development goals.
http://aps.journals.ac.za
African Population Studies Vol  25, 2 (Dec 2011)
247
the economy. 
Within Africa, we have also identi-
fied about 2/3 of the countries that are 
showing signs of adapting to their 
changing age structure with the right 
social and human capital development 
programs.
Possible outcomes of inappropriate 
policies for human capital 
development in SSA. 
According to World Bank (2000), SSA 
entered the 21st century with many of 
the world’s poorest countries. Many 
development problems are being faced 
in Africa, especially human develop-
ment issues, including lagging primary 
school enrolments, high child mortality 
and endemic diseases that impose costs 
on Africa at least twice those in any 
other developing region. Africa is the 
only major region to see investment 
and savings per capita decline after 
1970. Averaging about 13 percent of 
GDP in the 1990s, the savings rate of 
the typical African country has been the 
lowest in the world.
In this paper, I have highlighted, 
from the SEA experience, some of what 
it will take to benefit from the incipient 
shift in the age structure in favor of a 
working age population in SSA. It is 
conceivable that the latter will advance 
economically if appropriate policies are 
in place to redress the ugly situation of 
the last decade, for example, by grow-
ing the economy to a higher level, 
accompanied by increased savings and 
investment in human capital develop-
ment and employment generating activ-
ities. Besides, a lot of countries in the 
continent should be progressing faster 
towards the attainment of the millen-
nium development goals set for 2015; a 
social and human capital development 
compact needed in order to derive 
benefits from the demographic divi-
dend.
Without such appropriate policies 
and programs like the MDGs, the win-
dow of economic opportunity engen-
dered by an increase in the proportion 
of the working age population in SSA 
will be missed. African countries will be 
too slow to adapt to their changing age 
structure and will miss the demographic 
window of opportunity to secure 
higher productivity and economic 
growth. For example, the ongoing bur-
geoning of the labor force will continue 
to push young graduates from second-
ary and tertiary institutions into the 
urban labor force without appropriate 
skills, thus resulting in open unemploy-
ment, an overcrowded informal sector 
with varying degrees of underemploy-
ment. Already, in most of the large cit-
ies in Africa, a larger proportion of the 
working age population is visible “ eke-
ing out” a living on the streets.
Other possible outcomes of inap-
propriate policies for human capital 
development in Africa are increases in 
the magnitude of social ills like armed 
conflicts, political instability, irregular 
emigration, human trafficking etc which 
are attractive to unskilled and unem-
ployed youths in the region.
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